

Revitalizing Political Parties in Indonesia: Dissecting Patronage-Clientelism Dynamics vis- à-vis Political Representation

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Abstract: This paper discusses and describes the patron-client phenomenon within political parties. One of the reasons why patron-client relations persist in political parties is that the interests of the political elite are veiled and do not prioritize the dynamic aspects of democratization of political parties as a forum for people's representation. The method used in this study is a normative juridical research method using a statutory and conceptual approach and presented in a formal way qualitative descriptive prescriptive. Data was collected using the interview method, the researcher interacted with informants who were flexible and open to obtain the data needed in this paper. The theory used in this paper is the general patron-client theory, which has developed and is influenced by the political culture within the internal political parties. The results of this study indicate that the patron-client relationship between political parties and cadres is good in the aspects of party elites and candidates legislature. Regional head candidates that occur give rise to a reciprocal relationship which has implications for the non-occurrence of democratization schemes and principles within political parties as a forum for people's representation that will fill public positions. The patron-client phenomenon includes, among other things, personal

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gifts, interests that are family interest or morphological and have the nuances of money interest.

Purpose: To find out the forms of patron-client practices within political parties and society that give rise to reciprocal relationships that impact political polarization of representation that does not work well and is far from the principle of political party cadres as a representation of the people's will. as well as finding ideal concepts related to patterns of relations between parties, both relations between cadres, political parties and society in general.

Design/Methodology/Approach: Normative juridical using the statute and conceptual approaches.

Findings: The patron-client phenomenon can be caused by a lack of awareness and political education, as well as inconsistency and inadequate performance within political parties, both at the institutional level and among members of the legislature and executive.

Originality/Value: Examining patronage-clientalism within the context of political parties has received limited scholarly attention. The topic of voting behaviour during general elections often revolves around patronage-clientelism. However, this study specifically examines the phenomenon of patronage-clientelism within political parties and its implications for political corruption.

Keywords: political parties; patronage-clientelism; political representation

Paper Type: Research-Article

Introduction

One persistent issue within government bureaucracy pertains to the prevalence of patronage and clientelism, whereby politicians frequently exploit these practices to advance specific objectives that fall beyond the primary responsibilities and functions of the bureaucracy. Patronage and clientelism emerge as recurring patterns or modalities for sustaining leadership. The bureaucracy appears to have transitioned into a subservient entity catering to the needs of a specific group or political agenda rather than functioning as a conduit for the public's interests. The utilization of bureaucracy as a means to safeguard political

interests, rather than serving the public's interests, has become increasingly prevalent. This is mainly because many bureaucratic officials originate from political parties, creating a perception that political power is being wielded as a strategic tool within politics. Hence, it is evident that the contemporary Indonesian bureaucracy is intricately intertwined with the ongoing political dynamics, mainly emanating from the ruling party. This is primarily because regional and central leaders are appointed based on political voting processes. Consequently, it is not uncommon for bureaucratic policies to be influenced by these official's political backgrounds and cultural orientations, thereby leading to potential fragmentation within the government bureaucracy (Diana 2020).

According to a recent study examining the implementation of democracy in Indonesia, it has been posited that the political framework established after the New Order era has resulted in the emergence of a phenomenon commonly referred to as political clientelism. The party system and general elections have been demonstrated to establish a political framework that relies on material incentives, such as clientelism, to acquire and consolidate power. The structure above poses a significant risk to the sustainability of the democratic system established by the nation's founding fathers. The perception of this threat becomes more pronounced when the political system gives rise to a phenomenon commonly referred to as political corruption, wherein individuals seek and obtain power only to exploit personal and collective advantages from the state (Sukmajati and Disyacitta 2019). Upon perusing the 2019 Annual Report of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), it becomes apparent that a prevailing pattern exists wherein most corruption cases are perpetrated and originate from political corruption.

One of the initiatives the KPK undertakes to enhance the political sector is the implementation of political party funding

reform. This endeavor entails the enhancement of existing legislation pertaining to political parties and the electoral system (Yanuarti 2020). The issue of corruption stemming from political parties does not seek to undermine their role as the primary instrument in democratic systems. The presence of political parties in a democratic nation is vital. If we examine its historical trajectory, predating the attainment of independence, there existed a precursor to the formation of a political party that originated from a Muslim trade association known as Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI), which afterward transformed into a political entity referred to as the Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI).

Nevertheless, the mere existence of political parties does not inherently guarantee the establishment of a democratic and robust system. In autocratic nations, the utilization of political parties is often exploited to sustain the authoritarian regime. Furthermore, within the framework of a democratic system, it is essential to acknowledge that not all political parties possess the ability to contribute to the advancement of democratic quality effectively. Political parties, as one of the main elements of democracy, often display activities contrary to what is expected from the meaning of democracy itself, so people tend to have a skeptical view of political parties (Kurniawan and Handayani 2022). According to Samuel P. Huntington, establishing a robust and structured party system is needed to pursue the development and enhancement of democratic governance effectively. Undemocratic and non-institutionalized political parties pose a significant challenge to the democratic system and the effective functioning of government.

One of the research undertaken by Iwan Sidih in 2021 explores the topic of "Patron-Client Relations in the Election of Ray Suryadi Arsyad in the 2019 Legislative Elections for Dapil II Makassar City" as the thesis title suggests. This study examines the dynamics of the Patron-Client relationship in the 2019

Makassar city legislative election context. The statement above is intrinsically linked to the longstanding patron-client association established by Ray Suryadi's father in 1996. The benevolence exhibited by Ray Suryadi's father has profoundly impacted numerous individuals, subsequently motivating the constituents of Dapil II to participate in the 2019 Makassar city legislative election actively. Those who had previously availed themselves of the services Ray and his father provided willingly joined forces to form Ray's triumphant team, constituting a significant portion of the voting base. Furthermore, this collaboration facilitated the creation of successful campaign strategies and the organization of various campaign events. The activities above are undertaken voluntarily by the client (Sidih 2021).

Methods

This research method uses normative juridical methods by using a conceptual approach and statutory approach (Marzuki 2016).

Discussion and Findings

From Theory to Reality: Examining Patronage-Clientelism in Indonesian Political Parties

Suppose one considers politics as encompassing the domains of power dynamics, decision-making processes, formulation of public policies, and resource distribution. In that case, the elite refers to a select group of individuals actively participating in these spheres. C. Wright Mills said, "In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (Mills 2000). Within the framework of a social structure, a distinct cohort of persons consistently wields significant influence and frequently assumes the responsibility of shaping societal dynamics and transformations. However, it is essential to note that societal alterations are not exclusively contingent upon the actions or positions of this particular group. This illustration might be interpreted as an indirect representation of the classical-

elite idea, which posits that society is stratified and governed by a select number of individuals with the necessary capabilities and qualifications. Conversely, it has been argued by Abdul Chalik (Chalik 2017) that a subset of individuals within the human population are predetermined to be subject to governance.

When examining the evolution of post-reform political parties, it becomes evident that the general populace is inclined to view political parties as among the most corrupt establishments (Oktaryal and Hastuti 2021). Based on the Transparency International (TI) report of 2017, it is evident that political institutions in Indonesia, including the People's Representative Council (DPR) and Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), continue to hold the dubious distinction of being the most corrupt entities. Consequently, Transparency International Indonesia subsequently proposed that there should be a concerted endeavor to enhance the political institutional framework, particularly the People's Consultative Assembly (DPR) and Regional People's Representative Councils (DPRD).

Political institutions must develop an anti-corruption strategy to enhance political accountability and improve performance. It is essential to establish ethical standards to mitigate the risk of corruption, particularly within political parties. The governance of political parties, as a crucial element of democracy, must be addressed concurrently with anti-corruption efforts (Juniar 2021). This includes implementing a system of integrity and a framework for selecting and training political party members, ultimately contributing to the legislature's role in upholding integrity and anti-corruption values (Transparency International Indonesia 2017). Additionally, it is worth noting that the prevalence of money politics has been observed in many electoral processes, with political parties often being perceived solely as vehicles for attaining power. Consequently, there is a

pressing need for non-partisan individuals to engage in the political sphere.

According to Vedi R. Hadiz (Hadiz 2005), it can be observed that the parliament and political parties are predominantly comprised of individuals who were nurtured under the Suharto regime. The reconfiguration of power dynamics has occurred through establishing new political arenas, such as elections, political parties, and the parliament, accompanied by the formation of novel social alliances. This reconfiguration has also led to the consolidation of the regional elite, who were previously beneficiaries of the Suharto regime. Consequently, it is argued that oligarchic factions continue to control political parties and maintain a monopoly on allocating public positions. This situation is closely linked to the reliance of political parties on specific groups or individuals for financial support. Historical evidence suggests that reducing state financial assistance over a certain period reinforces the influence of oligarchy, corruption, and clientelistic practices within the democratic realm.

The global landscape of political parties has witnessed a transition from mass-based organizations reliant on member contributions to parties that depend on state assistance and corporate funding. This shift is particularly evident in countries such as Indonesia, where establishing a political party is subject to intricate requirements and substantial resources. These prerequisites encompass organizational management, branch offices, and financial obligations, necessitating significant financial investments. Furthermore, the financial burden becomes even more pronounced when considering the context of elections and political campaigns. Consequently, increasing state funding emerges as the most viable approach to address these challenges. Failure to do so may result in political parties financed by oligarchic groups, who may exploit their power solely for personal gain at the state's expense.

On the other side, when direct sources of funding from the state are not sufficient to meet the needs of political parties, the lack of funding will eventually be borne by members of political parties who occupy political positions. Usually, this contribution is the policy of political parties with an amount that becomes a burden for members of political parties. The impact is when political party members try to fulfill their obligations by increasing the facilities they receive, such as increasing allowances. Another experience that leads to the practice of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. For example, in budget discussions, there are always attempts to co-opt projects funded by the state to be given to business people affiliated with certain political party interests, use office facilities for political party activities, and recruit bureaucrats close to political parties. These indirect state subsidies ultimately damage the political parties (Mietzner 2007).

In the context of electoral processes, political parties face escalating costs in their pursuit of a more extensive voter base. This phenomenon is concurrent with the waning ideological influence of political parties and the consequent erosion of their affiliations with members, thereby impacting the fragility of organizational networks. Consequently, the capacity to mobilize political support is diminished. Therefore, political parties must explore alternative strategies to maintain societal relevance and sustain high electoral success. Notably, a recent study has revealed that partisan attitudes, as indicated by party identification, are a significant predictor in elucidating the prevalence of financial inducements in politics. Specifically, voters closely associating with a particular political party are three times more susceptible to being targeted by financial incentives than those lacking such affiliations (commonly called swing voters). This finding is intriguing as it suggests that a robust party base should ideally select a party based on non-material incentives.

This shows that the political machine tends to direct voters that money politics is a common and repeated practice (shared experience). The concept of "basic voters" or "loyalists" is increasingly held hostage in long-term political relations with political parties or politicians based on patronage ties. On the other hand, the system of nominating public officials by political parties does not place cadres as a priority to be submitted in elections. Competition often arises when people outside political parties are preferred because they have financial ability. In this context, candidacy buying occurs, where political parties are only "gatekeepers". Political parties remain important actors but are only a tiny part of a network used for patronage purposes, not as a *primus inter pares* of Indonesian clientelism. This is where it will be proven how weak the relationship between candidates and political parties is because the aim is only to gain a momentary advantage in the nomination process.

In the electoral process, political parties necessitate substantial financial resources to bolster their visibility and credibility among voters. One of the most costly endeavors is conducting mass media campaigns, as it is the primary means for political parties to disseminate their messages to a broad audience. Consequently, political parties encounter challenges sustaining their operations as internal donations prove increasingly inadequate to finance their activities. Therefore, political parties are compelled to sell political support (political dowry) or seek external contributions, often from business entities. However, it is essential to acknowledge that such donations may entail potential implications of kickbacks.

This condition leads to a disruption of the autonomy of political parties, rendering them dependent on significant donors for financial support. Consequently, political parties may transform into private entities or instruments serving the interests of these influential funders. This transformation results in the

disorientation and distortion of political parties, causing them to lose their status as essential representatives of the people's interests. Indonesia has previously endured a bitter experience during the New Order regime, which curtailed political freedom. Even during political transitions, control over political parties remains in the hands of the oligarchs.

This inquiry pertains to the process by which a fragmented and debilitated oligarchy, amidst a crisis, can reestablish its influence by co-opting newly formed governmental institutions and forging novel social alliances. This situation presents a paradoxical phenomenon wherein democracy and oligarchy can coexist harmoniously. Specifically, it highlights the potential for Indonesia to concurrently embody the attributes of a highly democratic nation and one plagued by corruption. This notion aligns with the concept of "criminal democracy," as elucidated by Jeffrey A. Winters (Winters 2011), wherein oligarchs routinely engage in electoral contests to distribute political power while leveraging their wealth to subdue the legal system through intimidation and persuasion.

The inclusivity of Indonesian democracy can be observed in the increasing participation of pro-democracy actors in formal political processes at the state level and the formalization of welfare issues in the public sphere. However, despite these developments, the substantive aspect of inclusivity remains weak. Various concerns have emerged regarding the lack of progress in achieving substantial democracy in Indonesia, primarily due to the high costs associated with political participation and the continued reliance on economic resources as the main power source. The involvement of non-party actors in driving reform and establishing a more substantive representation model is still limited and lacks a coherent strategy. The prevalence of clientelistic democracy persists, with the rise of populism accompanied by the continued distribution of power based on

patronage. Consequently, the governance of political parties is distorted, and their functions in the public sphere appear to have lost their significance.

The role of political parties in a democratic nation as a medium for political communication is primarily ceremonial, as it is commonly observed that political parties engage with the public solely during election cycles. However, when considering the function of a political party as a vehicle for political communication, it serves as an entity that consolidates the various desires of the constituents it represents (interest aggregation). It then assumes the responsibility of regulating and articulating these desires (interest articulation), ultimately formulating them into policy proposals incorporated into the party's political agenda (goal formulation). Finally, the policies and programs put forth by political parties are intended to be adopted as public policies.

Various Forms of Patronage can be defined as a reciprocal arrangement wherein benefits are provided for political support. It is essential to highlight that the transactional nature of patronage can present specific challenges. When candidates distribute gifts or monetary compensation to voters, they cannot be sure about the exact form of reciprocation they will receive. Commonly observed forms of patronage are often characterized by simplicity and straightforwardness.

- a. vote to buy. The present study focuses on the phenomenon of vote buying, specifically examining behaviors that can be categorized as such within a limited scope. Vote buying is defined as the systematic distribution of cash or in-kind payments by candidates to voters before an election, with the implicit expectation that recipients will reciprocate by voting for the candidate. In the context of Indonesia, various terms are employed to describe this practice, including the term 'dawn attack,' which draws from the historical backdrop

of the Indonesian revolution and signifies the practice of making payments in the early hours of voting day (although in reality, this practice more commonly occurs in the days leading up to the election).

- b. individual gifts. Candidates often give voters various personal gifts to support more systematic vote-buying efforts. Usually, they carry out this practice when meeting with voters, either when visiting homes or during campaigns. Sharing like this is often considered a social lubricant, for example, the assumption that gifts are gifts. Sometimes, the gifts are distributed by the campaign team. In such cases, the practice is not easily distinguished from the systematic buying of votes. The most common gifts fall into several categories. For example, gifts in the form of small items (e.g., calendars and key chains) accompanied by the name of the candidate and an image created for the candidate. Other gift items include groceries, such as rice, sugar, cooking oil, and instant noodles. Also, other small objects, such as cloth or household appliances, especially those with religious meaning (e.g., headscarves, mukenas, prayer rugs) or minor household items, such as glassware or plastic objects.
- c. Services and Activities. Services and activities play a significant role in political campaigns, as candidates frequently offer or fund various initiatives to appeal to voters. One prevalent form of engagement involves participating in community events, where candidates can promote themselves. Additionally, candidates may organize sports competitions, such as chess or domino tournaments, and forums for recitations, cooking demonstrations, communal singing, and parties. Furthermore, candidates often provide financial support for community services, including medical check-ups and accessible healthcare, previously associated exclusively with certain political party members.

- d. club goods. We define club goods as the practice of patronage given more for the mutual benefit of certain social groups than for individual use. Most of the club goods in Indonesia can be divided into two categories: donations to community associations and gifts to communities living in urban, rural, or other environments. Within Indonesia, there is a wide variety of formal and informal institutions at the grassroots level, such as religious groups, sports clubs, youth associations, women's groups, and farmers' cooperatives. Because of this, candidate visits to these communities accompanied by gifts of goods or other benefits are a widespread phenomenon. The goods distributed were worship equipment, sports equipment, musical instruments, sound systems, kitchen equipment, tents, agricultural equipment, etc. Candidates also often contribute to the construction or renovation of infrastructure needed by the community in certain areas, for example, houses of worship, roads, bridges or drainage canals, provision of street lighting, water wells for villages, and others.

It has been previously stated that establishing purely clientelistic connections is a practical approach to facilitating patronage. Consequently, this association extends beyond a mere transactional exchange of material resources in the short term but instead evolves into a durable relationship that mutually benefits both parties involved. As previously elucidated, it is worth noting that repetition is a significant characteristic of the significance of clientelism.

Candidates typically reward team members who have achieved success, including monetary compensation and promises of employment, contracts, or other advantages. Consequently, successful teams often comprise individuals who have previously benefited from the patronage politics employed by the candidate during prior elections. Additionally, candidates tend to prioritize the recruitment of formal or informal community

leaders, as voters typically align their political preferences with those of these influential figures. Building upon this foundational concept, this paper examines three fundamental types of voice broker networks utilized in Indonesia.

- a. successful team. This is the most common voting broker network used by candidates. Success teams are often referred to by other names, for example 'winning team', 'family team', and 'volunteer team'. These teams also vary in size. Those who help wealthy candidates for the central legislature can have thousands of members. However, the success team of poor candidates for DPRD usually consists of only a few members. Success teams are generally personal and function to promote campaigns for individual candidates. However, it is not uncommon for success teams to also work for several candidates through 'tandem' campaigns. Another description is the territorial and pyramidal structure of a successful team. Usually, a success team for a central DPR candidate will include a core team of advisors and assistants who work directly with the candidate. Underneath, there are several district/city coordinators, sub-district coordinators (korcam), village coordinators (kordes), and finally brokers at the grassroots, often referred to as 'field coordinators' (korlap) who interact directly with voters (various names are also used for call these positions).
- b. Social network engines. Candidates commonly utilize social network engines to garner support during elections. In addition to relying on success teams organized based on geographical territories, candidates often seek assistance from influential community leaders. The underlying expectation is that these individuals can mobilize their social networks to

generate support for the candidates. These community leaders frequently hold official positions within governmental institutions, such as village heads, dukuh heads, RT, or RW, or assume leadership roles in formal associations, including religious groups, ethnic organizations, and clubs.

Internal Challenges, External Impact: Managing Patronage-Clientelism within Political Organizations

Institutions and political parties rely on a broad support base to sustain their existence. The mass base serves not only as a means of support but also plays a critical role in demonstrating the effectiveness of political parties in disseminating their ideologies throughout society. Regrettably, the findings of studies on the affiliation of voters to political parties in Indonesia indicate that political parties generally lack a substantial mass following. For instance, a survey conducted by Poltracking Indonesia in May 2022 reveals that the majority of the public tends to favor individual figures (51.4%) over political parties (14.5%) (poltracking.com 2022). Indeed, the ability to engage in patronage within political parties cannot be obstructed once more. This is also connected to the application system that is directly proportionate to the level of patronage. The proportional representation system has shifted the dominance of political parties to the importance of a strong personal network with voters. This transformation has altered the perspective of individuals in selecting their political representatives. They have ceased to prioritize national party programs and policies. Contrarily, voters prioritize obtaining what is genuinely beneficial to themselves or their community. This condition has become the underlying basis for how patronage operates. The distribution of materials and the acquisition of vocal support became prevalent during the campaign. The candidates employ several strategies and tactics to enhance their ability to acquire and articulate their voice. They not

only compete with candidates from other parties but also with colleagues from different parties.

This trend occurs due to a lack of political awareness, political education, consistency, and quality performance within political institutions and among past members of legislative bodies and executive officials. There is a need to enhance political pragmatism. This phenomenon originates from inadequate political socialization within political parties themselves. These parties are often constrained by the dominance of ambitious elites who occupy leadership positions within the executive branch, such as ministers or heads of institutions. Consequently, political parties primarily serve as a means to fulfill the desires of these elite individuals rather than strengthening the organizational political machinery for long-term necessity.

In preparation for the upcoming General Election in 2024, political parties must prioritize maintaining and cultivating their mass base. This entails thoroughly examining and improving their relationship with the community, recognizing that the district represents a key stakeholder in the democratic process. Additionally, it is advisable to get regular updates on significant political and social matters throughout this period.

Beyond the Ballot: Political Parties Influence on Electoral Dynamics

Since the 2009 elections, Indonesia has adopted an open proportional electoral system, wherein voters can directly select candidates from a list of names for the legislature. This system differs from the closed proportional system that was in place from 1971 to 1997. Under the closed system, voters could only choose the party symbol, while the selection of candidates was determined by the party's internal mechanisms based on a predetermined numerical order.

The implementation of a proportional open system has had a significant influence on the dynamics of national politics. This

system empowers voters to elect individual candidates directly, enabling legislative members to better represent and respond to the needs of their people.

The system subsequently enhances the sovereignty of voters over political parties. As a result, political parties have limited control over the candidates they endorse. They primarily serve as "ticket providers" for candidates but do not offer sufficient support from the political machinery to secure electoral support. Thus far, candidates have relied more on personal networks rather than the support of party political machines.

This analysis aims to elucidate the phenomenon of discourse enforcement in the context of electoral processes, particularly in the preceding elections. It is observed that a closed proportional return system often manifests during this time. The underlying objective of this system is to consolidate the dominance of elite political parties, thereby exerting significant influence over candidates. Simultaneously, it facilitates the establishment of networks based on patronage and clientelism, enabling political parties to exercise control over candidates. Patronage and clientelism entail a reciprocal relationship between politicians and voters, wherein material exchanges are a prerequisite for political support.

The discourse surrounding the proportional closed return system is closely associated with the increasing prevalence of money politics in electoral processes. Legislative candidates and political parties incur significant expenses to compete in political contests and secure elections effectively. Implementing the proportional open system results in political parties lacking complete control over their cadres, often leading to financial dependence on these individuals. Consequently, the monitoring of election rules and guidelines is not optimally supervised.

In the given region, there is a lack of equitable distribution of qualified party members across electoral districts. Frequently,

party support and funding rely heavily on its members. Consequently, the oversight and management of cadre functioning becomes ineffective and inefficient. Despite these drawbacks, the proportional system increases opportunities to enhance societal participation. The open system fosters a more dynamic political competition, necessitating legislative candidates to be proactive and innovative.

Implementing an open system also enhances the accountability of legislators towards their constituents. This is because society possesses mechanisms to monitor the performance of politicians and political parties. If these control mechanisms were to be transferred solely to political parties, the oversight by the community would become more limited, potentially leading to a deterioration in the quality of democracy.

Institutional Enhancement of Political Parties: Strategies, Challenges, and Implications

When discussing the comparative merits of proportional open and closed option systems, the fundamental question pertains to the prevailing context of electoral governance and democracy. Specifically, we must determine whether our objective is to enhance the general public's or political parties' influence. It is evident that within a democratic system, the empowerment and increased agency of the populace should take precedence over the interests of political parties. Simultaneously, political parties should focus on enhancing their reputation and bolstering their operational efficacy, transforming into autonomous, robust institutions with a positive public perception.

One of the functions of political parties in a democratic political system is the function of political recruitment, which is a typical function of political parties (Taufikkurrahman 2019). For political parties, the nominated candidates play an essential role in determining the characteristics of the political party concerned in front of the public (Fitriyah 2020). When selecting candidates

for legislative positions, political parties should consider more than just popularity, financial strength, and fulfillment of quotas. Political parties must prioritize candidates who possess the personal capacity to comprehend the underlying societal issues. One potential approach for political parties is to enhance collaboration with non-profit organizations or self-sustaining community institutions (NGOs) to identify individuals with potential. This is because NGOs often possess social capital and a deep understanding of the root problems within society due to their proximity to the community.

Political parties can accept non-governmental organizations (NGOs) requests to endorse suitable people who wish to run for office. Political parties and NGOs need to establish an open and collaborative relationship to ensure the selection of candidates who can effectively contribute to legislative processes and enhance the overall welfare of society.

Furthermore, political parties must establish a structured and transparent organizational framework and promote a sense of ownership among their members. To enhance their effectiveness, political parties should adopt modern corporate practices like those employed by large corporations, such as implementing merit-based systems and fostering professionalism. By doing so, political parties can provide their members with equitable opportunities for career advancement within a democratic framework. Cultivating a sense of ownership within political parties is crucial, as it catalyzes overall competence and facilitates upward mobility within the organization.

To achieve this objective, political parties must exhibit transparency and accountability to all stakeholders while adhering to the principles of good party governance in their operational and decision-making processes. It is widely anticipated that political parties in Indonesia will undergo significant institutional improvements. These parties can

potentially serve as catalysts for political and ideological innovation and active platforms for societal participation. Whether one approves or disapproves, political parties in contemporary democracies have evolved into institutions that supply potential leaders and shape the trajectory of governmental policies, thereby influencing the quality of Indonesian democracy both presently and in the future.

In Indonesia, Law No. 7/2017 about the Election General (hereinafter referred to as Law No. 7/2017) mentioned that donation campaign funds can originate from party politics and combined party politics, candidates, community individuals, community groups, and companies or non-government businesses. The Constitution does not limit donations from (combined) party political candidate. However, the regulation regulates the limitation of donations from individuals in the community, community groups, And body business non-government. More details, Chapter 327 UU No. 7/2017 arranges that donations of funds campaign election president who originate from an individual No can exceed Rp. 2,500,000,000.00, and contributions from groups, companies, or non-governmental business entities may not exceed Rp. 25,000,000,000.00. Arrangement the same holds for elections legislature, as stipulated in Article 331 of Law no. 7/2017. Then, for the output dimension, there is three main matter. First, expenditure characteristics are legal, including expenses for making And installing brochures and posters, maintenance convoy from the supporters of the participants election, transportation, consumption, t-shirt campaigns, and advertising in the mass media. Second, expenses characteristic gray (between legal and illegal), for example, services to constituents (help for costs burial for participants who support election who die, fee assistance school, and help For cost of treatment).

Their association with illicit activities primarily determines the categorization of certain expenses as illegal. Such costs include the purchase of votes, bribes to media outlets, and various forms of bribery, including attempts to influence election outcomes by bribing election organizers. In Indonesia, there are no specific regulations that restrict campaign expenditure funds. However, certain technical and operational guidelines are outlined in Chapter 12 and Chapter 18 of the General Election Commission's Rules No. 24 of 2018, which pertains to campaign funds for the general elections (referred to as PKPU No. 24/2018). These guidelines stipulate that the disbursement of campaign funds for presidential and legislative elections should be used to purchase goods at a reasonable market price, with any discounts exceeding the fair transaction limit being subject to the regulations governing donations, as specified by the KPU.

Therefore, KPU Decree No. 2768/PL.02.4-Kpt/06/KPU/I/2019 about Cost Eat, Drink, and Transportation Campaign Participants arrange that meal cost, drink, And transportation most widely The same with standard cost which area set by government local area And costs the not given in form Money campaign participants. In Indonesia, Law No. 7/2017 mentions that campaign contributions can originate from party politics and a combination of political parties, candidates, community individuals, community groups, and companies or non-governmental business entities. The law does not limit contributions from (combined) party political candidates. However, these regulations restrict donations from individuals in the community, community groups, and body business non-government. In more detail, Chapter 327 Law No. 7/ 2017 stipulates that fund donation campaign election president Which originate from individual No can exceed Rp. 2,500,000,000.00, donation from groups, companies, or non-governmental business entities may not exceed Rp. 25,000,000,000.00. Arrangement the

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In Indonesia, no regulations currently impose restrictions on campaign expenditure funds. However, there are certain technical-operational level settings in place. For instance, Article 12 and Article 18 of PKPU No. 24/2018 specify that the spending on election campaign funds for presidential and legislative elections should be based on the market price of goods, ensuring that the prices are reasonable and any purchase of discounted goods should not exceed the reasonable limits of transactional sell-buy. These provisions also enforce limitations on contributions and require adherence to the regulations set by the KPU. Additionally, the Commission's decision No. 2768/PL.02.4-Kpt/06/KPU/I/2019 regarding the cost of meals, drinks, and transportation for campaign participants stipulates that the expenses for meals, drinks, and transportation should align with the standard costs set by the local government. These costs should not be provided as monetary contributions to campaign participants.

Conclusion

Patronage can be defined as a reciprocal arrangement wherein political support is exchanged for various benefits. It is

important to note that the element of exchange in patronage can sometimes present challenges. When candidates distribute gifts or provide monetary incentives to voters, they are uncertain about the nature of the response they will receive. Additionally, we have previously highlighted that establishing purely clientelistic relationships is one effective approach to ensuring the success of patronage. Consequently, this relationship extends beyond a mere short-term transaction of material goods between candidates and voters, evolving into a long-term association that is mutually advantageous for both parties. As previously mentioned, the recurring nature of clientelism is a significant characteristic in this context.

This phenomenon can be attributed to a lack of political awareness and education and inconsistencies and inadequate performance within political parties, both at the institutional level and among members of the legislature and executive branches. It also stems from the challenge of enhancing political pragmatism. This trend is rooted in the insufficient political socialization of political parties themselves. These parties often fall under the influence of ambitious elites who occupy leadership positions in the executive branch, such as ministers or heads of institutions. Consequently, political parties become mere tools for fulfilling the desires of these elite individuals rather than strengthening their organizational political machinery for the long term.

The choice of a democratic system to be implemented in Indonesia is a political consequence that must be accepted, including political parties as the main instrument in a democratic system. The main functions of political parties are vital in administering the state. The better political party governance, the better state administration's governance. In its development, the existence of political parties as the main actors of democracy invites various parties to be involved in the process of power. This is no exception for oligarchic groups who want full control over

state power intending to maintain their group's wealth. One of the most strategic entry points is through political funding. The greater the political funds originating from the oligarchs, the stronger the practice of patronage and clientelism in political parties and elections. It is in this position that the state's role is needed. The state needs to take part in managing political parties and recalling the functions of political parties directly related to the administration of the state. This is where the importance of enlarging the state's portion in funding political parties and elections. As a public body, this financing will affect political parties' governance. At this point, an accountability mechanism is needed, as with public agencies that use state finances as a funding source. So accountability is an integral part of political funding by the state.

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